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The article analyses how the formal legal systems in Ethiopia and Kenya 
marginalised and prevented traditional forms of resolving conf licts over 
natural resources. Both countries best illustrate two rapidly growing 
economies in transition. However, in Ethiopia and Kenya, conf licts over 
natural resource have to be understood in relation to their respective 
histories, politics and legal frameworks. Ethiopia maintained its freedom 
from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation 
from 1936 to 1941. Nonetheless, like all other African nations, it has a 
colonial heritage self-imposed onto its legal systems through the process of 
codification. In contrast, Kenya was a British colony until its independence 
in 1963 and its colonial administrative structures had different impacts 
on its traditional institutions and systems dealing with resolving conf licts 
of natural resources. The political dimension of natural resource conf licts 
in these two countries is manifested in the low recognition given to the 
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traditional institutions. The political motives and justifications for 
marginalising traditional dispute-resolving mechanisms in both countries 
are primarily based on the belief that providing a uniform and modern 
legal regime would promote socio-economic development and also serve 
as a precondition for effective nation building. The main argument in this 
article is that the formal mechanisms for resolving conf licts over natural 
resources in both countries – which adopted the Western-style systems – 
need to be complemented by traditional institutional practices. It highlights 
the need for synergy between the formal and traditional institutions. 
This synergy is characterised as a form of hybrid natural resource conf lict 
resolution. The article attempts to explore the regime of traditional natural 
resource dispute resolution in Ethiopia and Kenya, and recommends a 
way forward.
Keywords: Ethiopia, Kenya, codification, customary law, formal legal 
system, natural resources, formal conf lict resolution and traditional 
conf lict resolution
1. Introduction 
In common with most other regions in Africa, East Africa has witnessed 
many conf licts over its land and natural resources (ECA 2012: ix). As Fisher 
and others (2000:5) note, conf lict is a ‘relationship between two or more 
parties who have, or think they have incompatible goals’. The African 
Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD 2002:4) 
defines conf lict as 
... a state of human interaction where there is disharmony or a perceived 
divergence of interests, needs or goals. There is a perception that interests, 
needs or goals cannot be achieved due to interference from the other 
person(s). 
Conf lict is likely to have several impacts, which may include harm to both 
humans and the natural resource base. It is a very complex and multi-
dimensional social process (Woodhouse and Duffey 2000:21).   
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Conf lict partly springs from the increasing demand on natural resources 
owing to 
population growth, but also as a result of the continued depletion of these 
resources in both quantity and quality due to degradation, overuse and 
over-harvesting, governance deficits, and external factors such as climate 
change and commercial pressure (ECA 2012:ix). 
Even if the concept of natural resource is seldom specified, the World Bank 
Glossary defines natural resources as ‘materials that occur in nature and 
are essential or useful to humans, such as water, air, land, forests, fish and 
wildlife, topsoil, and minerals’ (World Bank 2016). Natural resources can 
be classified as either renewable or non-renewable. As per the United States 
Institute of Peace (USIP) (2007), renewable resources ‘such as cropland, 
forests, and water can be replenished over time by natural processes and – 
if not overused – are indefinitely sustainable’. Non-renewable resources 
‘such as diamonds, minerals, and oil are found in finite quantities, and 
their value increases as supplies dwindle’ (USIP 2007). In most cases, a 
nation’s access to natural resources often determines its wealth and status 
in the world economic system.
With regard to the typology of conf lict, one could say it is usually a 
confusing concept over which scholars in the field have not been able to 
reach consensus. However, it is categorised in many ways – taking the 
nature of conf licting parties, conf lict issues or conf lict causes as a 
parameter (Ramsbotham et al. 2005). Conf lict resolution practitioners 
take into account all levels of conf lict, including but not limited to family, 
criminal, civil, sexuality, gender, multinational and financial. 
Conf lict is part of life, and when it is wisely handled it could serve as an 
engine of progress. However cohesive a society might appear, it could be 
harbouring conf licts. We cannot expect a society with different interests 
and value systems to be immune from conf lict. But the point is that, even 
if conf lict is a common denominator to every society, it does not mean that 
all societies use similar ways of settling their conf licts. In their various 
societal, socio-economic and political contexts, societies indeed differ 
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in the modalities they use to resolve conf lict. Still, in the formal or/and 
informal methods they make use of, there are some shared similarities.
Although there are different practices in the world with regard to the use 
and management of natural resources, it is clearly visible that natural 
resources is a source of conf lict in society. In East Africa and elsewhere, 
when countries are endowed with natural resources and they are not wisely 
and properly managed, they turn out to be a curse rather than a blessing. 
In more recent times, however, some of these evil effects might be reversing 
as more local management is used. 
East Africa is one of the regions on the African continent endowed with rich 
and diverse natural resources, with amazing potential for their sustainable 
development. Such development, however, is premised on the need to have 
in place sensible mechanisms for dealing with conf lict, mechanisms which 
take into consideration the existing different traditional institutions in 
addition to the existing formal legal frameworks. 
In Ethiopia and Kenya, natural resource conf licts need to be understood 
in relation to their respective histories, politics and legal frameworks. 
Historically, Ethiopia is usually cited as the one instance where the colonial 
power had minimal impact on its existing legal system. However, like all 
other African nations, it has a self-imposed colonial heritage in its legal 
systems through the process of modernisation. In contrast, Kenya was a 
British colony until its independence in 1963. The colonial administrative 
structures had different impacts on Africa’s traditional institutions and 
systems dealing with natural resource conf lict resolution. 
In both countries, politics also plays a significant role in marginalising 
traditional conf lict resolution mechanisms in the area of natural resources. 
The political motives and justifications for marginalising traditional 
dispute mechanisms in both countries are primarily based on the belief 
that providing a uniform and modern legal regime would be necessary for 
the socio-economic development and would serve as a precondition for 
effective nation building.   
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With regard to the legal frameworks of the two countries, in Kenya, the 
colonial legal system was developed on the presumption that the law 
of the colonial power was superior to the traditional native customs 
(Odhiambo 1996). The colonial power in Kenya justified their actions on 
the pretext that they were bringing the benefits of modern government, 
economics and culture to Kenya (Odhiambo 1996). The legal systems and 
institutions introduced during the colonial era became the formal legal 
structure. Nevertheless, the traditional systems still operated, both formally 
and informally. Even though Ethiopia had its own civilisation, ideologies 
and cultures, ways of thinking and acting, as well as its own indigenous 
institutions (Jembere 2012:10), it nevertheless accepted modernisation 
through the adoption of legislation which followed Western models. 
In its drive to modernise, Ethiopia pursued a far-reaching legal reform in 
a series of codifications. However, unlike Kenya, which was influenced by 
the Anglo-American legal system, Ethiopia’s modernisation process was 
influenced by both continental European and Anglo-American legal systems. 
The main argument in this article is that the formal mechanisms for 
resolving conf licts over natural resources in Ethiopia and Kenya – which 
adopted the Western-style systems – need to be complemented by traditional 
institutional practices. The article highlights the need for synergy between 
the formal and traditional institutions. The synergy is characterised as a 
form of hybrid natural resource conf lict resolution.  
It is argued that as East Africa continues to develop and strengthen its 
traditional institutions for resolving conf lict over natural resources, this 
should attract the attention of government, practitioners and policy-
makers, and they should realise that these institutions deserve a recognised 
place instead of being subsumed in the formal system. It highlights the 
need for synergy between traditional and modern institutions of natural 
resource conf lict resolution. It contends that it is important not only to give 
due recognition to traditional institutions but also to facilitate increased 
collaboration with the formal institutions. However, the article cautions 
that the recognition of traditional institutions should not be a ground 
upon which to deter the analysis and consideration of their limitations. 
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The article also argues that the success of traditional dispute resolution 
over natural resources in Ethiopia and Kenya depends on the fact that 
natural resource related conf lict is linked to the social setting and cultural 
aspects of the community concerned.
2. The formal legal system vis-à-vis traditional or 
informal systems
Before dealing with the impact of the formal legal system on the traditional/
informal natural resource conf lict resolution in Ethiopia and Kenya, it 
would be appropriate first to put into perspective how the two concepts – 
formal legal system and traditional/informal systems – are defined in this 
article, ref lecting the various strands of development each country and 
system have witnessed. Section 2.1 below defines the formal legal system. 
Section 2.2 defines the traditional/informal system. Section 2.3 deals with 
the analysis of the main issues associated with a hybrid system of dispute 
settlement aimed to combine the best of each system and achieve a synergy 
of interests between local communities and central government.  
2.1 The formal legal system
The formal legal system in both Ethiopia and Kenya has been greatly 
inf luenced by the operation of a conventional (court system) mechanism of 
conflict resolution rooted in the Western legal tradition following common 
law and civil law systems. The strong underpinning by the rule of law has a 
tendency towards a more rigorous scrutinising and monitoring – whether 
internally or externally – for signs of partiality, entrenched inequalities 
or lack of due process (Macfarlane 2007:493). The formal system is most 
obviously visible through the introduction of written laws. It is centralised 
within the structure of the state system. It is also underpinned by a strong 
constitutional tradition and the operation of the constitution itself. All the 
processes and decisions are implemented through government and state 
institutions. It emphasises the determination of guilt and the executing 
of retributive punishment by physical or material penalties, often but not 
always without giving due regard to the re-incorporation of the offender 
into the community.
35
Traditional natural resource conflict resolution vis-à-vis formal legal systems
There is a strong tradition of rule-based decisions, but these are open to 
interpretation and formal remedy through further legal procedures and 
courts. Such a system gives pre-eminence to lawyers and legal opinions 
and is therefore often expensive and time consuming. It may exclude the 
poor and local communities, though this may not be fully intended in the 
design of the system. Pressure groups and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) may find it possible to obtain a voice but this is often difficult 
because of the costs involved. Some legal systems have given priority to 
NGOs as a means of re-balancing the system but this is often difficult 
to achieve.
As we can infer from the above paragraph, the formal legal system may find 
itself at odds with the traditional/informal system. However, the irony is 
that the traditional/informal system is persistently available in everyday 
life, and is able to deal with natural resource conf lict resolution.
2.2 The traditional or informal system 
Before dealing with the traditional/informal system let us first see what 
tradition means. The British philosopher H.B. Acton (1952/53:2) defines 
tradition as ‘a belief or practice transmitted from one generation to 
another and accepted as authoritative, or deferred to, without argument’. 
The American sociologist Edward Shils (1981:12) defines it as ‘anything 
which is transmitted or handed down from the past to the present’. 
While Samuel Fleischacker (1994:45) defines tradition as ‘a set of customs 
passed down over the generations, and a set of beliefs and values endorsing 
those customs’. 
However, considering the above definitions, this article argues that it is 
wrong to assume that tradition does not require justification. It is not 
always true that there is opposition between tradition and reason. Rather, 
tradition can be rationally examined by its followers. What is more, 
tradition is not completely authoritative and it is subject to criticism. 
If tradition were not subject to criticism and not subject to reason as defined 
above, the development of human culture would cease. The argument 
is not that tradition does not work; it is that it needs modernising. 
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As Kwame Gyekye (1997:263) notes, ‘Tradition has reached to the point 
where it is because successive generations have criticised it and enhanced 
it at the same time’. Equally true is that tradition does not have objective 
authority; all its objectivity emanates from the evaluative activities of 
recipient generations (Gyekye 1997:263). Thus, as far as this article is 
concerned, it endorses the definition of tradition as it is given by Kwame 
Gyekye (1997:263): 
Any cultural product that was created or pursued by past generations 
and that, having been accepted and preserved, in whole or in part, by 
successive generations, has been maintained to the present. (Note that 
‘present’ here means a certain, a particular present time, not necessarily 
our present, contemporary world). 
Tradition is always a manifestation of power in society and is susceptible 
to change. It is a myth to think traditions are immune from change. 
Traditions evolve and get altered over time. Or, as Giddens (2000:58) puts 
it, traditions are invented and reinvented. This also implies the fact that 
there is no such thing as pure tradition in our world. 
Giddens (2000:59) argues that it is simply wrong to suppose that for a 
given set of symbols or practices to be traditional, they must have existed 
for centuries. For him endurance over time is not the key defining feature 
of tradition. What is distinctive about tradition is that it defines a kind 
of truth (Giddens 2000:59). He further argues that traditions are always 
properties of groups, communities or collectivities. For him ‘Individuals 
may follow traditions and customs, but traditions are not a quality of 
individual behaviour in the way habits are’ (Giddens 2000:59). 
‘Traditions have their own guardians – wise men, priests, sages’ (Giddens 
2000:59). But the guardians are not the same as experts in the modern state 
structure. The guardians derive their position and power from the fact that 
they are capable of interpreting traditions’ ritual truth. They translate the 
meanings of the holy texts or symbols involved in the communal rituals 
(Giddens 2000:60).
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In the traditional or informal mechanism, unlike the formal legal system, 
all its processes and decisions do not come through the government 
apparatus; rather they are informally resolved through the norms and 
values of society. In this regard, Macfarlane (2007:492) notes that in all 
societies, it is common for people to look to shared substantive norms to 
resolve problems rather than to resort to legal norms. He further notes that 
traditional/informal systems tend to be perpetuated by traditions of oral 
history rather than by a codified and memorialised formal legal system. 
In every country, community or organisation, a system of informal dispute 
resolution – often based on community customs or familial relationships, 
or embedded in institutional practices – runs alongside the ‘official’ state 
sanction processes (Macfarlane 2007:487). Traditional mechanisms of 
conf lict resolution institutions aim to restore peace and harmony between 
the disputing family members, neighbours, clan or local groups so that 
the former litigants can continue to live together in frequent interaction 
(Assefa and Pankhurst 2008:260). In traditional mechanisms of conf lict 
resolution, the elders look for win-win solutions and in the final analysis 
their aim is repairing severed relations among the disputants.
The essence of this article is that it is imperative to include traditional/
informal natural resource conf lict resolution in Ethiopia and Kenya and 
that the act of the state to get rid of traditional practices altogether through 
the process of codification should not be accepted. Traditional natural 
resource conf lict resolution mechanisms are needed, and will always 
persist, because, as Giddens (2000:64) correctly puts it, traditions ‘give 
continuity and form to life’. But it should be underlined that traditions 
should be sustained not for the sake of sustaining them but since they can 
effectively be justified as a complement to formal codified ways of natural 
resource conf lict resolution. 
2.3 The complementarity of the formal and informal systems 
Currently it looks as if there is a need to talk on the emerging synergies 
between traditional and modern institutions of dispute resolution. 
Therefore, it is important not only to give due recognition to such 
institutions but also to facilitate increased collaboration between them. 
Nonetheless, the emerging recognition of traditional institutions should 
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not deter us from the analysis and consideration of their limitations. 
One of the glaring limitations is violation of human rights. In this regard 
Fiseha (2013:123) notes: 
They are male dominated and women are largely excluded from the process. 
Besides, there are some cultures and practices that still allow discriminatory 
and harmful practices such as female genital mutilation, early marriage, 
polygamy, rape, abduction and exchange of women as a means for ending 
blood feud between groups. 
However, it is unarguable that, when these limitations have been rectified, 
traditional legal institutions will continue to play a role in dispute resolution. 
One major reason, which is very pertinent in East Africa, is that the formal 
system of natural resource dispute resolution is not in a position to handle 
all natural resource related disputes by itself; hence the state will need to 
devolve responsibilities to local communities. Of course, at this juncture it 
must be clear that it does not mean the state has completely lost its status 
as a point of reference in dispute resolution, but the reality underscores 
the notion that traditional institutions should have a complementary role.
The second reason is that – in East Africa and elsewhere – traditional 
institutions of dispute resolution have the potential to contribute to the 
democratisation process. Just like many state-mandated institutions they 
open up spaces for ordinary citizens to participate in public processes such 
as natural resource dispute resolution and implementing environmental 
justice. The necessity is to find a system that takes account of local needs 
and addresses these.
In the sections that follow, the article deals with the impact of the formal 
legal system on the traditional or informal natural resource dispute 
resolution in both Ethiopia and Kenya. First, it starts from the practice in 
Ethiopia and then proceeds to Kenya.
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3. The formal legal system and traditional/informal 
natural resource conflict resolution in Ethiopia
3.1 The formal legal system in Ethiopia 
Historically, Ethiopia was the oldest independent state in Africa with a 
feudal land-holding system. With the collapse of Feudalism and its 
institutional arrangement in 1974, a revolutionary Marxist–Leninist 
military regime was institutionalised. Accordingly, there were radical land 
reforms oriented towards changing ownership patterns in favour of the 
poor and marginalised peasants and small landowners. With regard to the 
genesis of natural resource related laws and policies in Ethiopia, Pankhurst 
(2003:65) notes that government policies need to be seen in the context of 
shifting global ideologies. For instance, ‘the Military Regime’s intervention 
in natural resource management stemmed from an allegiance to socialist 
policies advocated by the Eastern Block’ (Pankhurst 2003:65). Hence, the 
natural resource conf lict resolution institutions introduced during the 
Marxist–Leninist regime were new and not based on traditional authority. 
The regime’s ideological basis of devolving decision-making authority to 
the community level institutions was also very new to the people. Equally 
true is that ‘Western aid after the 1985 famine and global views among 
donors about linkages between drought and deforestation prompted 
massive environmental rehabilitation initiatives through terracing and 
eucalyptus planting’ (Pankhurst 2003:65). Yeraswork (2000:12) also notes 
that ‘these conservation campaigns in effect reinforced state power and 
undermined community management by taking control of large tracts of 
local pasture and farmland’. 
In Ethiopia the codification process was sought by simply importing foreign 
laws, little related to Ethiopian behaviour patterns and little understood by 
those affairs they were meant to affect. In the 1950s and 1960s Ethiopia 
attempted to copy different laws from different countries. The aim was to 
modernise society and the legal system. Singer (1970/71:308) quotes the 
vision of Emperor Haile Selassie: 
The necessity of resolutely pursuing Our programme of social advancement 
and integration in the larger world community ... make[s] inevitable 
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the closer integration of the legal system of Ethiopia with those of other 
countries with whom We have cultural, commercial and maritime 
connections. To that end We have personally directed the search for the 
outstanding jurists of the continent of Europe to bring to Us the best that 
centuries of development in allied and compatible systems of law have 
to offer.
According to the Emperor’s statement, the spirit of introducing different 
laws in the 1950s and 1960s was to integrate Ethiopian legal traditions 
and institutions with those of foreign systems of law and thereby achieve 
development. Different codes were enacted in Ethiopia which were 
predominantly drawn from European sources. For instance, a Penal Code 
was enacted in 1957, Maritime, Commercial and Civil Codes in 1960, a 
Criminal Procedure Code in 1961 and a Civil Procedure Code in 1965 
(Beckstrom 1973:559). Before the introduction of these codes the law in 
Ethiopia was mostly dominated by customs, tradition and some legislation 
in the form of statutes and decrees. With regard to the law in the pre-
codification period in Ethiopia, Beckstrom notes that: 
Until the 1950's the law of Ethiopia was a rather amorphous mix. There was 
some legislation in the form of statutes and decrees, primarily in the public 
law sphere, as well as a Penal Code that had been promulgated in 1930. 
But, taking Ethiopia as a geographical whole, by far the major de facto 
source of rules governing social relations was found in the customs and 
traditions of the various tribal, ethnic and religious groupings (Beckstrom 
1973:559).
However, the transplantation of laws from different countries was not 
a successful project. This is because of the fact that the law was often 
imposed not as a result of a consensus and also because it failed to deliver 
democratic ideas or inf luences. It has clearly not brought the development 
and modernisation the government was looking for. 
Beckstrom notes that ‘Ethiopia is one of the world's least economically 
developed countries, with a low literacy rate and poor technical and 
administrative capabilities. Thus, one can theorise that the laws of more 
developed nations might not easily take root in Ethiopia’ (Beckstrom 
1973:559). Singer (1970/71:308) argues that ‘the basic shortcoming of the 
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program [codification process] was the attempt to institutionalise legal 
values without first investigating the readiness of the various segments of 
Ethiopian society to accept a shift in power structure’. Clapham (1973:333) 
argues that ‘it is in the inadequacies of state power as an instrument of 
development that much of the answer to the problem/puzzle of Ethiopian 
failure is to be found’.
The codification process of the 1950s and 1960s in Ethiopia was inf luenced 
by the belief that the law could be used as an instrument of change by 
imposing it from above without any visible public participation and 
without analysing the political, economic and social context. By then the 
theory of law as a means of social engineering was dominant. However, the 
failure could be explained in relation to the failure of law and development 
movement that was initiated in the United States. 
Snyder (1982:373) notes that ‘the movement was born as America’s cold war 
foreign aid programs in the late 1950's’. Trubeck and Galanter (1974:1062) 
also note that ‘[the movement] adopted the basic tenets of modernisation, 
adhering to the notion that evolutionary progress would ultimately 
result in legal ideals and institutions similar to those in the West’. They 
labelled these legal ideals and institutional similarity as legal liberalism. 
They identified legal liberalism as a situation in which 
1) society is made up of individuals who consent to the state for their 
own welfare; 2) the state exercises control over individuals through 
law, and it is constrained by law; 3) laws are designed to achieve social 
purposes and do not offer a special advantage to any individuals or 
groups within the society; 4) laws are applied equally to all citizens; 
5) courts are the primary legal institutions with the responsibility 
for defining and applying the law; 6) adjudication is based upon a 
comprehensive body of authoritative rules and doctrines, and judicial 
decisions are not subject to outside influence; and 7) legal actors follow the 
restraining rules and most of the population has internalised the laws, and 
where there are violations of the rules enforcement action will guarantee 
conformity (Trubeck and Galanter 1974:1062).




Scholars such as Snyder (1982:373) note that the law and development 
movement did not succeed. He argues that its failure lies in its assumption 
that ‘the answer to many problems in underdeveloped countries lay in 
the modernisation of legal and social structures according to an idealised 
version of United States history’ (Snyder 1982:373). Marryman (1977:483) 
notes that ‘the law and development movement has declined because it 
was, for the most part, an attempt to impose US ideas and attitudes on the 
third world’. Tamanaha (1995:486) notes that the crisis of the movement 
lies in its assumption that ‘law can solve the many problems facing the 
developing countries’. 
3.2 Impact of the formal legal system on traditional natural 
resource conflict resolution in Ethiopia
In Ethiopia, side by side with the formal natural resource conflict resolution 
mechanism, societies also have their own traditional ways of dealing with 
resolving conf lict over natural resources. In many regions of Ethiopia, the 
traditional natural resource conf lict resolutions are more inf luential, more 
accessible and stronger than those of the formal, imposed and command-
and-control regulatory system. 
The traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are practices employed to 
resolve conf licts and maintain peace and stability in the rural communities. 
In this regard Enyew (2014:137) notes that traditional dispute mechanisms 
in Ethiopia are 
[v]ibrant in rural areas where the formal legal system is unable to penetrate 
because of a lack of resources, infrastructure and legal personnel as well 
as a lack of legitimacy, for the modern law is seen as alien, imposed, and 
ignorant of the cultural realities on the ground. 
Traditional practices are deeply rooted in different ethnic groups of Ethiopia 
and arise from age-old practices that have regulated the relationships of 
the peoples in the community (Regassa et al. 2008:58). They are associated 
with the cultural norms and beliefs of the peoples, and gain their legitimacy 
from the community values instead of the state (Jembere 1998:39). In other 
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words, the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms of Ethiopia function 
on the basis of local traditional practices or cultural norms. However, due 
to the multi-ethnic composition of the country, the traditional laws of 
Ethiopia are different from ethnic group to ethnic group and as a result 
they do not have uniform application all over the country. 
In Ethiopia, traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are administered 
by elders. The elders’ main target is to reconcile the conf licting parties and 
their respective families. They emphasise 
the restitution of victims and reintegration of offenders; and aim at 
restoring the previous peaceful relationship within the community as well 
as maintaining their future peaceful relationships by avoiding the culturally 
accepted practices of revenge (Enyew 2014:145). 
Though traditional dispute resolution mechanisms continue to play a 
significant role, the laws of Ethiopia do not provide adequate breathing 
space for these practices (Assefa and Pankhurst 2008:5). This was 
manifested by the repeal provision of the Ethiopian Civil Code that 
abrogates the application of customary laws. This repeal provision (Civil 
Code of the Empire of Ethiopia 1960: Art. 3347(1)) reads:
Unless otherwise expressly provided, all rules whether written or customary 
previously in force concerning matters provided for in this code shall be 
replaced by this code and are hereby repealed.
This legal provision rendered all customary practices out of use – irrespective 
of whether they were consistent or inconsistent with the provisions of the 
Civil Code – by the mere fact that the Code covered and regulated such 
matters. This transplantation process was, thus, a drastic measure taken 
against customary dispute resolution mechanisms and made them lose 
formal legal recognition and standing. De facto, however, customary 
dispute resolution mechanisms remained functional on the ground, as 




In the aftermath of the Dergue regime, the coming to power of the Ethiopian 
Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has brought about a 
significant change in recognising the role of the traditional justice system. 
The government's introduction of the principles of ethnic federalism in 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution (1994) 
has shifted the paradigm of relations between customary and state-
designed legal systems. The enactment of this Constitution revived formal 
legal recognition of customary laws. One of the relevant constitutional 
recognitions is provided under Art. 34(5) of the Constitution, which reads: 
This Constitution shall not preclude the adjudication of disputes relating 
to personal and family laws in accordance with religious or customary laws 
with the consent of the parties to the dispute (emphasis added). 
According to the above legal provision, customary dispute resolution 
mechanisms are legally authorised to regulate personal and family matters 
as long as the conf licting parties give their consent to that effect. In line 
with this legal recognition given to customary laws, the Constitution 
(Art. 78(5)) also authorises the House of People Representatives and 
State Councils to establish and to give official recognition to religious 
and customary courts. These provisions obviously show that the FDRE 
Constitution took some important steps towards recognising legal diversity 
or pluralism by recognising customary laws and their institutions. However, 
such recognition is still limited to civil (i.e. personal and family) matters. 
The Constitution does not rectify past mistakes and fails to extend the 
legal recognition to applying customary dispute resolution mechanisms 
in matters involving natural resources. This, despite the fact that they are 
still being used to resolve conf licts and serve as the main way of obtaining 
justice, especially in rural Ethiopia.
Hence, the Constitution limits the mandate of the customary dispute 
resolution institutions only to private and family disputes by specifically 
excluding their application to conf licts relating to natural resources. In the 
Ethiopian case, these natural resources are not personal or family issues; 
instead, they are public issues. For instance, Art. 40(3) of the Constitution 
clearly states: ‘The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as 
of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples 
of Ethiopia’. 
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Nonetheless, with regard to this limitation certain interpretative 
arguments may arise. For instance, one could argue that the absence of 
express recognition in the Constitution of the application of customary 
laws to natural resource conf lict resolution does not necessarily mean that 
they are totally excluded from application. One could argue that if that 
were the case, the Constitution would have provided expressly for that. 
In the light of a broader, holistic interpretation of the Constitution, it could 
be argued that a total exclusion of the application of customary laws to 
natural resource conf lict matters would defeat the overall objectives of the 
Constitution to ensure lasting peace and to maintain community safety.
On the other hand, the a contrario interpretation of Art. 34(5) of the 
Constitution may be understood as implying an explicit prohibition of 
the application of customary dispute resolution mechanisms to natural 
resource conf lict matters. However, the article seems to favour the first 
line of argument, which favours the broader, holistic interpretation. This is 
important as it helps to give formal legal status to applying customary laws 
in natural resource related conf licts.
In short, Ethiopia exhibits plural legal systems – both multi-layered state 
laws and customary laws, though formal recognition is not given in very 
clear terms to the use of customary dispute resolution mechanisms in 
natural resource conf lict issues. However, how the House of Federation 
which is empowered to interpret the Constitution or the Supreme Court 
(especially the Cassation bench) will decide on such issues is something to 
be seen in the future. 
4. The formal legal system and traditional/informal 
natural resource conflict resolution in Kenya
4.1 The formal legal system in Kenya 
Now we turn to examine Kenya in a similar manner – by discussing the role 
of traditional law followed by an analysis of how it might be integrated into 
the modern legal system. 
Kenya is a former British colony which gained its independence in 1963. 
Prior to colonisation, indigenous traditional laws and customs were used 
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to resolve conf licts and disputes. Among the traditional Kenyan people, 
conf lict resolution was dependent on the people’s ability to negotiate. 
Nonetheless, ‘with the arrival of the colonialists, western notions of justice 
such as the application of the common law of England were introduced in 
Kenya’ (Muigua 2010:39). The colonial system introduced the adversarial 
court system, which greatly eroded the traditional conf lict resolution 
mechanisms in Kenya (Muigua 2010:39).  
Muigua (2010:39) also notes that before the country was colonised 
communities in Kenya had their own conf lict resolution mechanisms. 
Whenever a conf lict arose, negotiations were conducted. The council of 
elders or elderly men and women could act as third parties in the resolution 
of the conf lict (Muigua 2010:27). Disputants could be reconciled by the 
elders and close family relatives and advised on the need to co-exist 
harmoniously (Muigua 2010:27). The existence of traditional conf lict 
resolution mechanisms such as negotiation, reconciliation, mediation and 
others, geared towards fostering peaceful co-existence among Kenyans 
(Muigua 2010:27), is sufficient evidence that these concepts are not new in 
the country; they are practices that have been in use for a very long period 
(Muigua 2010:27). 
With regard to the effect of legal transformation in Kenya, Michael 
Ochieng Odhiambo (1996) notes that ‘[t]he British were directly involved 
in running the country, affecting traditional resource management systems 
and institutions’. He further notes that 
[s]ince independence, the country's historical issues related to natural 
resources have been dominant in shaping the country's structure, especially 
since the country has maintained the political structure inherited during 
the colonial period. Today, several resource management conflicts in 
Kenya have stemmed from the country's move to economic liberalization 
through free markets. Ownership policies specific to natural resources have 
progressively been moving towards privatization in order to compliment 
economic policies. This has resulted in private land tenure replacing 
communal tenure and weakening traditional practices (Muigua 2010:27).
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4.2 Impact of the formal legal system on traditional natural 
resource conflict resolution in Kenya 
In Kenya, traditional dispute resolution is recognised in Art. 159 of the 
2010 Constitution. This recognition is based on the assumption that access 
to justice should be ensured for every citizen, whether it be in courts of law 
or in informal forums that avoid the procedural hurdles of formality in 
the court system. It could also be argued that, as indicated in Art. 11(1) of 
the same Constitution, this recognition is meant to recognise the diverse 
cultures of various communities as the foundation of nation building. 
Art. 159(2)(c) of the 2010 Constitution mandates the courts to be 
guided by ... traditional dispute resolution mechanisms provided that 
they do not contravene the bill of rights; are not repugnant to justice and 
morality or result in outcomes that are repugnant to justice or morality; 
or are not inconsistent with the Constitution or any written law. 
During the colonial period, the colonists regarded Kenyan customary law as 
inferior to written laws and therefore felt they had to place limitations on its 
application (Okoth-Ogendo 2003:107). After independence, statutes such 
as the Judicature Act (Cap. 8, Laws of Kenya) and the Magistrate Courts Act 
(Cap. 10, Laws of Kenya) were enacted to guide courts when determining 
customary law claims. That was the situation until the promulgation of 
the 2010 Constitution. For instance, the courts in Kenya have applied 
S3(2) of the Judicature Act to declare customary law repugnant to justice 
and morality. However, the challenge to the application of the repugnancy 
clause is that Kenyan laws do not define what justice and morality mean. 
In such a situation, judges have had wide discretion in determining what 
is repugnant to justice and morality. What is more, these two Acts set out 
the hierarchy of the laws and also determined the scope of traditional law. 
With the Promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the law-makers created 
an opportunity for exploring the use of traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms (TDRMs) to manage conf licts over natural resources 
(Art. 159(2)(c)). One of the principles enshrined in the Constitution is 
the encouragement of communities to settle land disputes through local 
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community initiatives consistent with the Constitution (Art. 60(1)(g)). 
The implication of such provisions is that before a matter is referred for 
court adjudication, communities are required to make legitimate attempts 
to resolve the matter using the most appropriate mechanisms available to 
them. This is also reinforced by the fact that one of the functions of the 
National Land Commission is to encourage the application of traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms in land conflicts (Art. 67(2)(f)). This is 
a significant provision considering that land conflicts form the bulk of 
natural resource conflicts reported in the country, and the land issue is an 
emotive one. 
However, in Kenya, the existence and applicability of customary law have 
to be proved in court. For instance, the Court of Appeal of Kenya in the 
Atemo v. Imujaro case ([2003] KLR 435) decided that customary law has 
to be evidently proved in court for it to be regarded as law. Similarly, in 
Ernest Kinyajui Kimani v. Muiru Gikanga and Another ([1965] EA 735), the 
court held that where customary law was not notorious or written, the party 
relying on it must prove it in court. Compared to the other sources of law 
in Kenya – the Constitution, statutes, common law and equity, which the 
courts take judicial notice of – the existence and applicability of customary 
law have to be proved. From this one can argue that the fact that customary 
law has to be proved in court illustrates the low place it occupies in the 
juridical order. What is more, the existence of grounds such as repugnancy 
and subjection to other written laws provides fertile ground for the rejection 
of customary law. 
In the Judicature Act, customary law is used only as a guide; while in the 
Constitution, the courts are to be guided by TDRM principles. No law 
requires the courts to apply customary law or TDRMs; they are to be used 
only as a guide. The implication is that the courts may refuse to apply them 
even in appropriate cases, since they are only a guide. Consequently, the 
judicial officers hearing a certain matter have absolute discretion in applying 
customary law within the formal justice system. However, the Constitution 
seems to clarify the juridical place of customary law at least by recognising it. 
This may contribute to greater recognition and the promotion of traditional 
justice systems by courts as a means of enhancing access to justice. 
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Nonetheless, Art. 159(3)(c) retains the hierarchical inferiority that existed 
prior to 2010 by introducing the repugnancy clause issue in relation to 
traditional justice mechanisms. By implication, traditional justice systems 
and customary law are still inferior to common law and principles of 
equity, of which courts do take judicial notice of under s 60 of the Evidence 
Act even though customary law has to be proved in court. 
In addition, S3 of the Judicature Act also ranks the common law and 
principles of equity above customary law and in effect TDRMs. The only 
time customary law ranks over the common law is when the form has 
been codified into statutes – for instance, polygamy under s 3(5) of the 
Law of Succession Act. A challenge then arises due to the unwritten and 
uncodified nature of customary law. Inadequate codification of customary 
law principles into statutes ensures that customary law and TDRMs remain 
at the bottom of the legal totem pole. 
Thirdly, Art. 159(3)(b) of the Constitution bars the application of TDRMs 
when they are repugnant to justice and morality. The Constitution and 
other statutes provide neither a definition nor do they clarify what justice 
and morality entail. Further, the courts have hitherto not interpreted justice 
and morality within the context of the challenged customs and TDRMs. 
Therefore, a judicial officer has leeway to determine what justice and 
morality are. More often than not, judicial officers use their own models of 
justice and morality or borrow from other areas and use them as standards 
to evaluate customary law or TDRMs. The position ignores the reality that 
different tribes, communities and ethnic groups have different customs. 
Using one custom as the means of evaluating the justice and morality of an 
unrelated custom amounts to subjugation. 
5. Conclusion 
In Ethiopia and Kenya, state and traditional systems can work together 
cooperatively, complementing one another. However, to realise this, a 
paradigm shift towards mutual respect and understanding of the formal 
and informal systems of natural resource conf lict resolution is required.
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To pave the way to this paradigm shift, it is advisable to consider focusing 
on synergy, on what each system could contribute to the constructive 
evolution of the other. If they cooperate and complement each other 
respectfully, they can strengthen one another through legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and capacity to support all citizens in resolving their conflicts. 
The connection between the traditional structures and state institutions 
in both countries can ensure sustainable conf lict resolution. Ultimately, 
an effectively integrated state-local approach to natural resource conf lict 
resolution can promote the larger agenda of peace and security in natural 
resource dispute resolution in both countries.
However, the comparative analysis of the legal frameworks of Ethiopia 
and Kenya shows that in both countries there is a tacit understanding in 
the sphere of government that the evolution of natural resource conf lict 
resolution is from traditional systems to imported, formalised systems. 
What is more, the political situation in these countries has been oriented 
towards recognising government institutions to the neglect of traditional 
ones. In particular, the marginalisation of traditional conf lict resolution 
mechanisms with respect to natural resources is evident. Moreover, the 
move towards the devolution of power in these two countries has often 
been limited to the decentralisation of executive authority. 
In both countries there is a need to complement the formal justice system 
in managing natural resource conf licts with more informal mechanisms 
(traditional dispute resolution) as this would promote the spirit of the 
2010 Kenyan and the 1995 Ethiopian constitutions. This complementarity 
also helps to promote Art. 48 of the Kenyan and Art 37 of the Ethiopian 
Constitution, both of which guarantee access to justice. Access to justice as 
enshrined in both Constitutions is to be realised where traditional processes 
and formal systems reinforce each other. However, although the Ethiopian 
and Kenyan Constitutions guarantee the right of access to justice and also 
go further to recognise traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, there 
are no elaborated legal or policy frameworks for their effective applications. 
The existing legal frameworks do not provide comprehensive guidelines 
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on linking traditional natural resource dispute resolution with the formal 
court process. This frustrates the utilisation of traditional natural resource 
dispute resolution in both countries.
Finally, without manipulating or politicising the traditional natural 
resource dispute resolution mechanisms, both countries should continue 
to embrace them. They merit being viewed as a key feature in natural 
resource dispute resolution in Africa.
Recommendations
•	 A task force to examine the role of traditional conf lict resolution 
mechanisms in natural resources needs to be established in both 
countries. This task force should convene traditional leaders and other 
relevant stakeholders in order to map and understand the prevalence 
and use of TDRMs, as well as their intersection with the formal system. 
•	 To institutionalise the complementarity of the formal and traditional 
conf lict resolution in natural resources in Ethiopia and Kenya, both 
countries need to develop a clear legal and policy framework. 
•	 The traditional conf lict resolution mechanisms in natural resources 
need to be clearly recognised and their jurisdictions need to be 
clearly demarcated. 
•	 An enforcement mechanism for the decisions of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms needs to be put in place.
•	 A mechanism for appeals from decisions of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms should be put in place. 
•	 The relationship between the formal and traditional dispute resolution 
mechanisms also needs to be spelled out clearly.
•	 Traditions and customs in both countries need to be included in the 
formal education system. This helps to enhance respect for the culture 
in both countries. 
•	 And in order to develop the jurisprudence of traditional dispute 
resolution in natural resource dispute resolution in both countries, 
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